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INTRODUCTION 
Information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies is a key element of the 
U.S. government’s homeland security strategy. For federal officials, the post-9/11 threat 
environment requires a “trusted partnership” among federal, state, and local agencies to 
“make information sharing integrated, interconnected, effective and as automatic as 
possible in order to ensure our national security.”1 To support this vision, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) administer 
more than a dozen homeland security-related information-sharing systems.2 
Additionally, numerous governmental, commercial, and non-governmental 
organizations provide officials with homeland security alerts, updates, and databases to 
support preparedness efforts.3 State-level “fusion centers” also integrate, analyze, and 
disseminate “all-source” homeland security information. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks focused public attention on the need for better information 
sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies. 
For example, the report of the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees, which investigated the circumstances surrounding 9/11, noted that “one of 
the most significant problems examined during the open hearings was the lack of 
information sharing between agencies.”4 Similarly, the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report 
concluded: “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater likelihood of 
connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”5 As a 
result, the 9/11 Commission stated that agencies “should provide incentives for sharing, 
to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.”6 Many of the 
findings of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission were codified into law as part of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Additionally, former 
President Bush issued several executive orders requiring federal agencies to develop and 
implement policies and systems designed to enhance information sharing. These efforts 
culminated in the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing.7 
More than two decades of research has correlated information technology use with 
organizational effectiveness.8 As a result, there has been little reason for officials to 
doubt the premise that improving the country’s information-sharing systems will 
enhance homeland security preparedness.9 Enormous financial, human, and 
technological resources have thus been dedicated to information-sharing initiatives 
across federal, state, and local levels.10 It is therefore striking that so few empirical 
studies have sought to confirm the basic premises underlying information-sharing 
discourse and organizational practice.11 One reason to reexamine these premises is that 
results have been marginal or counterintuitive in studies that have attempted to 
correlate information sharing with decision quality,12 emergency preparedness,13 
response planning,14 and law enforcement productivity and effectiveness.15 These 
studies generally affirm a 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report which 
found that “although important, the benefits of sharing information are often difficult to 
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discern, while the risks and costs of sharing are direct and foreseeable.”16 Additionally, 
recent reports by both the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Markel Foundation indicated that major challenges in 
implementing information-sharing initiatives endure.17     
Admittedly, the government’s information-sharing strategy will take many years to 
implement, and some might argue that evaluating the strategy’s efficacy is premature. 
The goal of this preliminary study is to explore how officials make sense of the 
connection between homeland security information sharing and preparedness at the 
local level. In the best case, information sharing evokes images of progress, 
technological sophistication, security, collaboration, and reform. This study suggests, 
however, that information sharing also evokes images of turf war, bureaucratic 
ineptitude, irrelevance, and technological obsolescence. The perspective on information 
sharing advanced herein is based on the principle that organizational discourse (e.g., the 
speech and writing of organizational members) and symbolism help to generate 
understandings of information sharing and preparedness in ways that influence 
practice.18 Exploring this discourse and symbolism can, ideally, help stakeholders better 
design, implement, conduct, and monitor information-sharing efforts that meet 
preparedness objectives.  
This study first reviews recent research concerning information sharing and 
preparedness to suggest why the assumed definitions of these concepts, and the 
relationship between them, requires a second look. The initial attempt to provide that 
second look involved using the government’s premises and relevant scholarly literature 
to generate hypotheses and a survey instrument. The survey results, however, mostly 
reinforced the ambiguous findings of earlier empirical studies. A communication 
perspective and respondent interviews attempted to account for this ambiguity. After 
describing the theoretical perspectives and methodologies used herein, this study 
provides an analysis of the survey and interview responses. It concludes with a 
discussion of implications for both research and policy. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION SHARING AND 
PREPAREDNESS  
William V. Pelfey explained how information sharing ideally leads to improved 
awareness and preparedness: “If … information sharing [is] effective, threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities can be effectively identified, targets can be appropriately hardened, and 
suspects identified while an event is still in its inchoate stage.”19 Thus, officials who 
access homeland security information-sharing systems on a routine basis should 
generally be more aware of potential threats than those who seldom access such 
systems.20 Frequency of information system use has also been found to correlate with 
decision quality.21 Therefore, based on the posited relationships among frequency of 
system use, awareness, and decision quality: 
Hypothesis 1A: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence awareness of homeland security threats.  
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Hypothesis 1B: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence the perceived level of organizational preparedness.  
The ISE [Information Sharing Environment] Implementation Plan notes that 
information quality issues have hampered information-sharing efforts: “Most critical 
infrastructure sectors … are still concerned with the limited quantity and quality of 
information and the need for more specific, timely, and actionable information.”22 In 
their updated review of the information systems success literature, William H. Delone 
and Ephram R. McLean found a significant correlation between “information quality” 
and “individual impacts.”23 Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, relevance, and 
consistency defined information quality while decision-making performance, job 
effectiveness, and quality of work defined individual impacts. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that stakeholders who find the information available via information-sharing 
systems of high quality will tend to use those systems more frequently and report higher 
levels of job effectiveness than those who perceive the information quality to be low. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2A: Level of perceived homeland security information quality will 
influence frequency of information-sharing system use.   
Hypothesis 2B: Level of perceived homeland security information quality will 
influence perceived level of job effectiveness.   
The concept of preparedness eludes agreed upon definitions and measures. Ronald D. 
Fricker, Jerry O. Jacobson, and Lois M. Davis state: 
Because of the lack of authoritative threat and outcome assessments, 
preparedness or lack thereof in any particular jurisdiction is largely a matter of 
subjective opinion. Without comprehensive threat assessments, it is exceptionally 
difficult to define how much preparation is enough and hence specify what 
‘appropriate’ preparedness is for any jurisdiction.24 
Pelfrey attempted to establish a more concrete definition of preparedness by explaining 
that preparedness can be seen as both a “cycle” and an “end-state.” As a cycle, the four 
phases of preparedness are prevention, awareness, response, and recovery – success in 
all four areas is required for preparedness efforts to be effective, according to Pelfrey. 
Although emergency management officials may engage in various prevention activities – 
protection, preemption, deterrence, and mitigation – these activities are more often the 
responsibility of law enforcement. Awareness, response, and recovery, however, concern 
emergency managers. For example, emergency managers are responsible for being 
aware of the early signs of a chemical or biological attack, responding to an emergency 
scene (i.e., containment, control, management of the incident, mitigation, and 
treatment), and recovery (i.e., rehabilitation, restoration, and repair).25 
Preparedness is also defined – and more commonly understood by the public – as an 
end-state. The assertion that “our organization is prepared for homeland security 
emergencies” connotes the end-state of meaning of preparedness. Pelfrey argues that 
the cycle framework is more appropriate for homeland security practitioners than the 
end-state framework because preparedness depends on “enactment” within an ever-
shifting social context. This study explores the government’s premise that homeland 
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security information sharing supports preparedness using both the end-state meaning 
of preparedness (tested in Hypothesis 1B above), as well as the four-part cycle of 
preparedness described by Pelfrey. The second phase of the preparedness cycle, 
“awareness,” is accounted for in Hypothesis 1A above. For reasons discussed below, 
information sharing is viewed here as contributing mainly to the first two phases of the 
preparedness cycle (prevention and awareness), with response and recovery capabilities 
being largely unrelated to the frequency of information-sharing system use. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3A: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence perceived ability to “prevent” homeland security emergencies.  
Hypothesis 3B: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will have no significant influence on perceived ability to “respond” to homeland 
security emergencies. 
Hypothesis 3C: Frequency of homeland security information- sharing system use 
will have no significant influence on perceived ability to “recover” from homeland 
security emergencies.  
Studies by Brian J. Gerber et al. and Martin J. Zaworski underscored the ambiguous 
relationship between information sharing and preparedness.26 Gerber et al. tested the 
hypothesis that state-level government communication of threat information to 
municipal government agencies aids in preparedness action. This hypothesis was only 
partially supported. In one model, increasing state government communication of threat 
and other related information to municipal government actually decreased 
preparedness action. To account for this unexpected finding, the authors stated: “These 
… results can be viewed as coherent if one accepts this premise: Information sharing 
from state to municipal officials should matter on an issue of coordination [i.e., 
adopting new mutual aid agreements] but should matter less on whether a city is able to 
actually perform a [homeland security] plan test.”27 From this perspective, information 
sharing contributes to awareness and prevention, but it may not necessarily help in 
response and recovery efforts (Hypotheses 3B and 3C).  
Finally, in a study of whether automated information sharing helped law enforcement 
officers work better, Zaworksi found no significant difference in perceived effectiveness 
or performance between the group of officers that used automated information-sharing 
technology and the one that did not.28 Additionally, “There was no difference between 
[the group that used automated information sharing technology and the one that did 
not] in how they think [the technology] affects their productivity [and] essentially no 
difference between the two groups in how they saw the role of information sharing in 
making arrests.”29 Zaworksi stated: “Because [test group] officers have access to 
regional information and thus would seem to be better equipped to make arrests, this 
result was unexpected.”30 Zaworksi speculated that differing management climates 
within the control and test groups explained this result; but when combined with the 
findings from the studies mentioned above, taking another look at how homeland 
security information sharing relates to preparedness is warranted.  
 








This study involved two phases. In the first phase, a survey was administered to 
information-sharing system users to test hypothesized relationships between 
information sharing and preparedness. Support for the hypothesized relationships was 
generally weak; therefore, in the second phase of the study, interviews were conducted 
with homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency management officials to 
better understand how these officials made sense of the meanings of and 
interconnections between information sharing and preparedness.  
In Phase 1, an online survey was administered to LLIS.gov (Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing) members to understand their perceptions and practices 
concerning information sharing and preparedness. LLIS.gov is a national network 
linking emergency response providers and homeland security officials. LLIS.gov “seeks 
to improve preparedness nationwide by allowing local, state, and federal homeland 
security and response professionals to tap into a wealth of front-line expertise on the 
most effective planning, training, equipping, and operational practices for preventing, 
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism.”31 To access 
LLIS.gov, one must generally be an emergency response provider, law enforcement 
official, or a homeland security official at the local, state, or federal level. 
LLIS.gov administrators permitted the posting of a twenty-seven-item survey on the 
homepage of the website, which was available to registered users from May 1, 2007 to 
May 15, 2007; 101 responses, eighty-three of which were mostly complete, were 
received. All responses were anonymous. The terms and conditions governing the use of 
LLIS.gov precluded random or stratified sampling techniques. In this study, the 
correlation coefficient and probability values for linear models containing two variables 
are reported. Results from this sample are likely not representative of the LLIS.gov user 
population. The sample may under-represent users who engage in information-sharing 
and preparedness activities yet are too busy to participate in an online survey. Certainly, 
such users might have answered survey questions differently than did the sample. As a 
result, findings from this study are not generalizable to the LLIS.gov population. 
Nevertheless, convenience sampling is often used in exploratory research, and the 
results can still provide important insights.32 
Because of the limitations of the survey, and the ambiguity surrounding conceptions 
of information sharing and preparedness, a second research phase was necessary. Phase 
2 involved interviews with information-sharing systems users from May 15 to August 3, 
2007. Interviews were semi-structured, and each lasted an average of forty minutes. 
Interview questions are provided in Appendix A. In general, interview themes were 
related to respondents’ attitudes, perceptions, and practices concerning information 
sharing and preparedness. A semi-structured approach permitted more detailed 
questions based on the interviewees’ responses. In other words, respondent interview 
techniques were used to: (1) elicit respondents’ understandings of “information 
sharing,” “preparedness,” and associated concepts; (2) identify the decisive elements of 
an expressed opinion concerning the relationship between these concepts; and (3) to 
determine what influenced this opinion.33 One administrator for a federal-level 
information-sharing system and nine LLIS.gov users scattered across the country were 
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interviewed, for a total of ten interviews. The nominal titles of the interview participants 
are listed in Appendix A. 
FINDINGS 
PHASE 1: SURVEY 
Appendix A lists several tables which provide descriptive information about the survey 
respondents. Respondents’ use of and perceptions about homeland security information 
sharing and associated systems, as well as an overview of the hypotheses and survey 
results are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Information Sharing and Preparedness Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 1A. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence “awareness” of homeland security 
threats. 
Respondents who use homeland security 
information-sharing system more frequently 
are significantly more likely to report being 
aware of homeland security threats. (r = .25, p 
= .022) 
Hypothesis 1B. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence the perceived level of organizational 
preparedness (“end-state”). 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived level of 
organizational preparedness (“end-state”). 
Hypothesis 2A. Level of perceived homeland 
security information quality will influence 
frequency of information-sharing system use. 
No significant association was found between 
perceived information quality and frequency of 
information-sharing system use.  
Hypothesis 2B. Level of perceived homeland 
security information quality will influence 
perceived level of job effectiveness.   
There is a significant positive relationship 
between homeland security information 
quality and perceived level of job 
effectiveness. (r = .23, p = .046) 
Hypothesis 3A. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence perceived ability to “prevent” 
homeland security emergencies.  
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to prevent 
homeland security emergencies.* 
Hypothesis 3B. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
have no significant influence on perceived 
ability to “respond” to homeland security 
emergencies. 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to respond 
homeland security emergencies.  
Hypothesis 3C. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
have no significant influence on perceived 
ability to “recover” from homeland security 
emergencies. 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to recover 
from homeland security emergencies. 
* Result requires explanation provided below.  
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As predicted, respondents who more frequently used homeland security information-
sharing systems were significantly more likely to report being aware of homeland 
security threats (r = .25, p = .022). However, frequency of use generally did not 
significantly correlate with the remaining three phases of the preparedness cycle 
described by Pelfrey (prevention, response, and recovery), nor did frequency of use 
significantly correlate with preparedness as an end-state. Respondents saw the use of 
LLIS.gov as overwhelmingly unhelpful in preventing homeland security emergencies 
(this finding is unsurprising when considering that LLIS.gov does not claim to provide 
“actionable” information); therefore, the use of LLIS.gov was disaggregated from “other 
information sharing systems” in order to determine whether those other systems (e.g., 
COPLINK, LEO, RISS) were perceived as being more helpful. When this disaggregation 
was performed, there was, in fact, a significant association between participants’ 
frequency of system use and perceived ability to prevent homeland security emergencies 
(r = .25, p = .026). Thus, all measures of preparedness with both the combined and 
disaggregated system-use variables were tested; prevention was the only measure where 
the results changed significantly.34  
Supporting studies within the information-systems success literature, there was a 
significant positive relationship between homeland security information quality and 
perceived level of job effectiveness (r = .23, p = .046). However, perceived information 
quality was not significantly correlated with information-sharing-system frequency of 
use. Frequency of use is a widely employed – but increasingly contested – variable in 
information systems research;35 therefore, the survey results were also analyzed using 
respondents’ overall opinion about the usefulness of information-sharing systems. 
There was no change in the results when opinion was substituted for frequency of use as 
an independent variable. In other words, those who held a more favorable opinion of 
information-sharing systems did not perceive themselves or their organizations to be 
significantly more (or less) prepared for homeland security emergencies than those who 
held a less favorable opinion. However, emergency managers (M = 4.71, SD = 1.15) were 
more likely than the other occupational subgroups (M = 3.98, SD = 1.46), such as law 
enforcement or public health personnel, to believe themselves to be prepared for 
homeland security threats when preparedness was defined as an end-state (t(81) = 2.08, 
p = .041). 
Overall, however, there is little evidence that increased information-sharing system 
use significantly increases perceived level of preparedness when preparedness is defined 
as an end-state. Nevertheless, there is some support for the premise that with more 
frequent use of information-sharing systems, users will tend to perceive themselves to 
be more aware of potential homeland security threats and perceive their organizations 
to be more capable of preventing homeland security emergencies. This finding 
reinforces Gerber et al.’s claim that information sharing contributes mainly to the first 
two phases of the preparedness cycle (prevention and awareness), while perceived 
improvements to response and recovery remain largely independent of information-
sharing efforts.36 Discussion with survey respondents would be needed, however, to 
adequately explain the dynamics of this situation.  
These results also suggest that one’s perceived level of job effectiveness tends to rise 
as the perceived quality of homeland security information increases. This finding 
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reinforces and extends Zaworski’s conclusion that information “comprehensiveness” 
assists law enforcement officers in doing their jobs.37 This study suggests that other 
components of information quality (accuracy, timeliness, relevance, and consistency) 
are important for increasing perceived job effectiveness in a homeland security context. 
These results, however, say little about the meanings stakeholders give to the terms 
information sharing and preparedness. 
PHASE 2: INTERVIEWS 
The section above outlined the theoretical case for predicting a significant, causal 
relationship between information sharing and preparedness. While there were 
important limitations to the survey, as well as some indications of support for a handful 
of hypotheses, findings also affirmed the ambiguous and unexpected results of earlier 
empirical studies. What then accounts for the ambiguous relationship between 
information sharing and preparedness? A communication perspective helps to explain 
this ambiguity. Specifically, a communication perspective emphasizes the active role 
that audiences play in categorizing messages via pre-existing historical, cultural, and 
political frameworks, and evaluating those messages in terms of source credibility, 
intention, and trustworthiness.38 This perspective maintains that information sharing 
and preparedness are not objective phenomena with concrete properties and causal, 
law-like effects; rather they “are labels for the organized, institutional claim-making 
process which constitutes these phenomena.”39 In other words, information sharing and 
preparedness are the result of social processes through which groups assert and 
negotiate which objects, concepts, and practices represent those activities.40 A 
communication perspective makes sense for this study because it is important to 
understand how stakeholders construct the meanings of homeland security information 
sharing and preparedness and how they act in accordance with those meanings.  
Interview responses from ten homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency 
management officials suggest the following explanations: (1) definitions of information 
sharing and preparedness are contextually based, multiple, and at times conflicting, 
making the impact of information sharing difficult to ascertain;( 2) information received 
via these systems is usually vague, which constrains preparedness action; (3) 
information glut and associated responses dampen the influence of information sharing 
on preparedness; and (4) both information sharing and preparedness occur in the 
context of institutional norms that shape interpretations of message credibility, 
intention, and trustworthiness. 
The Problem of Definition 
No consensus definition of information sharing arose from the interview respondents. 
Instead, respondents offered an array of definitions for information sharing, many of 
which expressed dissatisfaction with current processes: 
Information sharing means a centralized area where you can grab stuff. 
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[Information sharing means] every little bit of information about everything that 
has to do with day-to-day crises to doom-and-gloom…all day, everyday, without 
filter.  
There’s a very fine line between information and shit, and I think what we see a lot 
of times is that everybody’s swapping shit.  
I don’t know, and that’s one of the problems I think we have right now.  
 
Several respondents also defined information sharing as a task that local officials are 
expected to do without much reciprocity from the federal level.  
Information sharing means a two-way street, but more often it’s a one-way street.  
[Information sharing] means information going to the JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task 
Force] and very little coming back. 
  
One law enforcement official explained the roots of his frustration with the “one-way 
street.” He stated that “the FBI has been horrible to work with. They’ve been a huge 
stumbling block.” This official explained that his city’s police department had discovered 
the name of a resident on a terrorist watch list. When he queried the FBI as to why this 
might be the case, the response he received was, “I can’t tell you.” The response was all 
the more frustrating because the FBI had earlier sponsored this official’s security 
clearance in order to facilitate information sharing. This official stated: “They [the FBI] 
have an elitist attitude. Of course, they’ll tell you differently. They come here and say 
‘we’re here to help’ and ‘we’ll share our information,’ but it’s all just smoke and mirrors. 
They want you to give them information so they can put it in a file somewhere.” 
Vague Information 
For the majority of respondents, vague information created significant obstacles to 
improving preparedness. Respondents commented on the quality of the homeland 
security information they received from federal-level systems.  
It’s all after-the-fact. There’s little value added.  
When it first came out, I was pretty active on LLIS, but then I thought: ‘Why am I 
doing this?’ 
It’s mostly useless. 
  
One respondent elaborated on how vague information constrains preparedness action:  
We’ll get a vague warning about threats to water treatment facilities, and there are 
several water treatment facilities in this area. The warning will be based on 
‘unconfirmed information.’ So I’m left wondering whether I should I go speak with 
the water treatment operators. I’ll call the FBI to get more information and they’ll 
say, ‘we don’t have any more information.’ I can’t get any specifics. There is just not 
enough detail for me to go to the city and request the money to harden those 
facilities. If I go to my chief with that information, he’s going to laugh at me.  
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Respondents explained that the types of information that would be useful for them in 
doing their jobs would include: 
Geographically-specific information and intelligence would be helpful instead of 
broad, general statements about threats.  
Specific information about suspects and bad guys.  
Actionable intelligence. This is something I need to know because it’s something I 
could or should react to.41  
 
Respondents universally valued interpersonal communication with their colleagues, 
finding it the most useful source of relevant information. One respondent explained: 
“The best source for information I get is from my contemporaries in other jurisdictions 
close by that I work with on a regular basis. We meet frequently and email frequently, 
[my colleagues provide] information that has been vetted and is of value.” The value 
officials placed on interpersonal communication likely stems from the opportunity it 
provides for officials to demonstrate their expertise, value, and influence, and to 
“bespeak their past and future competence.”42 Nevertheless, the government’s 
information-sharing strategy continues to emphasize impersonal electronic systems, 
databases, and alerts.  
Information Glut  
Information glut is a perennial problem in intelligence and national security-related 
organizations.43 The volume of information respondents typically receive has led some 
to simply delete or ignore much of it.  
If I didn’t have department to run it would be kind of fun to just sit at home and 
look at all this stuff.  
I can’t tell you how many passwords I have. They say, ‘Here’s the next thing. It’s a 
special thing for senior government officials, just log on.’ I don’t even do it 
anymore … I’ll look at them and there’s never been anything on there that’s of any 
value…. To be honest, I do this, and my guess is other people do it as well in my 
position, is that an awful lot of stuff gets deleted without ever being read…. If 
everything’s a priority, nothing’s a priority.  
 
Respondents emphasized the need for some sort of information “filter.” Whether state-
level fusion centers – the emerging linchpin in the government’s information-sharing 
strategy – can successfully fulfill that role is an open question. Some respondents 
recognized the value of the fusions centers, while others have not yet perceived any 
benefit.  
[Fusion centers] need to be staffed by more than just law enforcement … the all 
hazards approach has not been embraced by a lot of areas.  
We need people in leadership positions deciding what’s important.  
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What I’d prefer is a system where we recognize the sender as someone who has 
credibility and the information is not just something somebody’s sending to kind of 
cover their ass.  
We’re looking at getting a watch officer to distill this information down into a daily 
brief to help reduce some of the time spent reading stuff.   
 
Institutional Norms 
Institutional identities play a significant role in how information sharing is interpreted. 
Several local officials indicated that longstanding distrust of the federal bureaucracy has 
not waned in recent years.  
You’ve got all these hyper [federal-level] people bouncing around on their cell 
phones and Blackberries not paying attention to what’s going on because they’re all 
trying to share some shit so that they’re not the one blamed for not passing 
something on. 
There are a lot of people in Washington with word processors and a great 
imagination typing up more and more stuff that none of us have time to do 
anyway.  
 
Other officials, however, indicated a more positive relationship. “We’ve always had 
excellent working relationships with [federal officials],” stated one official. Several 
respondents also acknowledged that federal information sharing was hindered by 
antiquated classification rules and procedures the government is currently trying to 
address. As one official explained: 
Our law enforcement officials learned about a chlorine truck that needed to be 
tracked. Classification issues prevented the information from being shared with the 
fire department and emergency management organizations – but those are the 
agencies that have done the training and can best respond, so they need to know. 
By federal rules, they can’t share the information about the truck beyond law 
enforcement. It’s [still] an issue at this point. 
 
These examples suggest that the meaning of information sharing is constructed in 
reference to institutional identities and local organizational contexts. While many 
respondents acknowledged that in principle information sharing is vital to 
preparedness, several officials perceived current information-sharing initiatives as a way 
for federal officials to bridge the government’s post-9/11 (and Katrina) credibility gap 
with the public. The mocking tone of some of the responses highlighted above might, 
ideally, spur stakeholders to more critically examine current policies and practices. The 
issues identified by the respondents are certainly well known to many government 
officials. The government has responded to these challenges, in part, by seeking to foster 
“a culture of information sharing” within and among federal, state, and local agencies. 
The comments presented above indicate enduring friction points as the government 
attempts to change perceptions, align institutional subcultures, and alter information-
sharing practices. 








An assumption circulating within information sharing discourse is that the effectiveness 
of information sharing can be measured in terms of information flow, distribution, 
timeliness, coordination, and related system performance measures.44 The Information 
Sharing Environment’s [ISE] stated mission is to ensure the ability of agencies to share 
information – but just who is responsible for ensuring that such abilities to share 
information tangibly improve preparedness remains unclear. This study indicates that 
using system performance measures and capabilities to assess the effectiveness of 
information sharing is inadequate and potentially wasteful and misleading. As one local 
official in this study explained, “We’re in uncharted territory, with a lack of legal 
assistance, and a lack of leadership in some cases. [Information sharing is done] by a 
bunch of local people who all of a sudden have got millions of dollars pouring at them, 
and they’re trying to make the best use of it with limited guidelines. It’s been very 
challenging.” In developing metrics to assess the benefits of information sharing, 
officials must engage in the difficult task of relating system use to tangible 
improvements in preparedness. 
Information-sharing initiatives also unfold within varying budgetary constraints and 
divergent funding priorities. As a result, future research needs to address how financial 
and structural conditions influence information-sharing processes and practices. This 
study also suggests the need for comparative and longitudinal research of information 
sharing. However, future studies that attempt to construct concrete variables for 
hypothesis testing may similarly confront the contingency of the meanings of 
information sharing and preparedness. Although information sharing and preparedness 
are socially-defined concepts, their meanings can be mapped within different 
organizational contexts and across time using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Doing so can potentially assist policy makers and practitioners assess the 
utility of information-sharing strategies and the impact of associated organizational 
change efforts. Assessing whether the users of a given information-sharing system find 
the system valuable to preparedness efforts, as well as systematically explicating the 
features of highly useful systems, can aid in the their development. Additionally, a 
longitudinal approach would help assess how definitions of information sharing and 
preparedness, their associated practices, and stakeholder perceptions are changing over 
time.  
Finally, attempting to create a “trusted partnership” and a “culture of information 
sharing” in absence of clear, abundant evidence regarding how information sharing 
tangibly improves preparedness may ultimately undermine the government’s 
information-sharing strategy. This study highlighted local-level officials’ uncertainty 
regarding the effectiveness of current information-sharing processes. As one respondent 
concluded: “I hope somebody someplace has more information that they’re utilizing to 
protect the country because I’m not seeing a lot of stuff that’s of great value.” Given 
similar findings in recent reports, and the resources being dedicated to information 
sharing at all levels of government, further scrutiny of how information sharing relates 
to preparedness is warranted. This preliminary study has provided a modest step in that 
direction.  
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APPENDIX A – SELECTED SURVEY DATA 
Respondent Demographics (N=83)* 
 
Age  Gender  Education  
21-29 years 5% Male 71% Some college 11% 
30-39 years 16% Female  23% 2 year degree 6% 
1. 40-49 years 30% N/A 6% 4 year degree 17% 
2. 50+ years 45%   Some graduate 
credits 
19% 
N/A 5%   Master degree or 
higher 
42% 
    N/A 5% 
      
Occupation  Role  FEMA Region  
Emergency 
Mgmt. 
25% Management 48% I 5% 
Law Enforcement  18% Operations  18% II 8% 
Fire 5% Support  8% III 21% 
Public Health 12% Other 19% IV 11% 
Other 31%   V 11% 
N/A 8%   VI 12% 
    VII 6% 
    VIII 4% 
    IX 12% 
    X 4% 
 
* Some categories do not total 100% due to some respondents not providing an answer.  
 
Source from Which Most Often Receive Homeland Security Information 
(N=83) 
Homeland security email / bulletins / alerts  34 
Face-to-face meetings with colleagues 5 
Email or telephone calls with colleagues 17 
Newspapers / magazines 5 
Radio 1 
Television  2 













Most Frequently Used Homeland Security Information Sharing Systems  
 
COPLINK, HSIN (Homeland Security Information Network), InfraGard, Intelink, 
LEO (Law Enforcement Online), LLIS (Lessons Learned Information Sharing), 
RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems) 
 
Frequency of Homeland Security Information Sharing Systems Use 
(N=83) 
 LLIS Other Systems 
Less than once per month 16% 35% 
Monthly 48% 22% 
Weekly 34% 31% 
Daily 2% 12% 
 
Survey Questions Related to Preparedness  
 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization for homeland security 
threats in your region? (preparedness as an “end-state”) 
In your opinion, how aware are you personally of homeland security threats 
facing your region? 
In your opinion, how aware is your organization of homeland security threats 
facing your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to prevent a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to respond to a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to recover from a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
 
Interview Participants (Nominal Titles) 
 
Administrator, Federal-level Information Sharing System 
Assistant Coordinator, County Office of Emergency Management 
Assistant General Manager, City Emergency Preparedness Department 
Coordinator, Regional Homeland Security  
Detective 
Director of Municipal Information Sharing System 
Director of Public Safety, County-level  
Director, City Office of Emergency Management 
Director, County Department of Emergency Services  
Intelligence Detective 
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